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ccording to Susan Haack in “The Real, the Fiction-
al, and the Fake,” “sortal terms”I have to be applied 
to the term “real” in order for it to become clearer. 
She makes this distinction specifically regarding a 
problem she has with fictional characters where although “there 
really are fictional characters, those fictional characters aren’t re-
al.”II However, in the article she makes multiple distinctions be-
tween things either being real or fictional. Although she dispels 
the syntactic paradox that exists in fictional things really existing 
but not being real, she applies the division of the real and fiction-
al very liberally. 
 Haack approaches these distinctions from the basis of her 
“innocent realism.” This principle suggests that there is “one real 
world” which contains everything from thoughts and objects of 
the imagination, to physical objects and social institutions: gener-
ally  everything both physical and imagined.III Although she in-
cludes institutions in her “innocent realism,” I will argue in this 
paper that even with “sortal terms,” she fails to take into account 
how social structures and attitudes determine whether something 
is real or not. I will make this argument on the basis of the mone-
tary system. Haack comments on the monetary system when she 
distinguishes between real and counterfeit money to demonstrate 
that some entities can be either real or fictional. However, this 
account fails to appreciate that real money may not be treated as 
such outside of a specific culture, although it is still real money. 
This implies a possible normative relativism regarding reality, 
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where a thing may be true or real in one culture, but differ im-
mensely in another.IV This argument will be based upon what the 
monetary system represents in differing cultures. In the first sec-
tion of the paper, I will summarize the article by Susan Haack to 
which I am responding. In section two I will use the monetary 
system as a basis to criticize her distinction of the “real” as nec-
essarily needing “sortal terms,” suggesting that this distinction is 
insufficient in regards to certain institutions. The third section 
will consider a counter argument to this criticism of Haack’s 
method. In the fourth section I will summarize and conclude that 
Haack’s theory is unable to sufficiently account for the monetary 
system. 
Susan Haack is concerned with the idea that there can really 
be fictional characters, but the characters themselves aren’t real.V 
She wants to find a way to dispel the paradox this suggests, so 
that what is meant by “real” can be clearer. Haack approaches 
this problem by first looking at various contrasting terms to 
“real.” She first considers “real” as contrasted with “fake” or 
“supposed.” She uses this definition of real to contrast real mon-
ey and counterfeit money, as well as other “real” items and their 
imitations. The idea of the “real” is important to her theory of 
reality as it gives her room to consider how the products of the 
imagination affect our concept of reality and the “real.” 
 Haack first considers the definitions of “real” offered by 
other philosophers. She considers the philosophical definition of 
“real” as meaning “independent of us,” and then considers the 
definition of “real” as being simply “mind-independent.” She is 
dissatisfied with these definitions, as in her view of reality ideas, 
thoughts, and all of the products of these mental faculties are re-
al; that is, they all exist in one reality.VI After exhausting her dis-
tinctions of both physical and imaginative things, all of which 
take place in her conception of reality, she then applies the 
“sortal terms” to the idea of imagination. 
 Haack’s application of sortal terms to the imagination 
serves as a foundation for her later application of these terms to 
fiction. She makes three distinctions regarding the imagination. 
Firstly, there is an imagined X, which is later followed by a real 
X. Secondly, the X is purely imagined and not acted upon. Final-
ly, X is once again imagined but instead of later becoming real, it 
Aaron Weddle 50 
instead becomes a physical representation of X.VII  
 Haack is concerned in the third section of the article with 
the intricate nature of reality and the degrees in which it can be 
manifested. This concern stems from her concept of varying de-
grees of truth and fiction in reality, and their ability to coincide 
with one another. She exhausts a seemingly limitless number of 
examples of different degrees of fiction, representation, and their 
respective relationship to what is “real.” For the purpose of the 
article and the resolution of her problems with fiction in reality, 
she settles on simply analyzing fictional characters and places 
(and not the nature of their various representations). Although she 
limits her focus, Haack claims that the distinctions she makes are 
also applicable in a more general sense to the imagination and the 
products of the imagination, as well as representation in reality. 
 Finally, Haack attempts to construct a new way of talking 
about what is “real” to avoid paradox when we speak about 
things which are “fictional.” Haack attempts to resolve this para-
dox by asserting that when we use the humdrum version of 
“real,” which she describes as contrasting to “fake,” we are refer-
ring to “real X.” She argues that the same treatment of the term 
“real” is also necessarily implicit in the metaphysical use of the 
word “real.” She claims that when the matter is treated in this for-
mat, you can say without contradiction that there are real fictional 
people, but these same fictional people are not real people. By 
distinguishing the specific term X to which “real” is being ap-
plied, we are able to avoid the paradox.VIII 
In this paper, I argue that Haack’s application of “sortal 
terms” is not sufficient to explain social institutions. Her use of 
the real by distinguishing it with a “sortal term” does not take into 
account how institutions vary from culture to culture. While she 
includes institutions in her concept of “one real world,” the neat 
segmentation of reality according to her “sortal terms” appears to 
be insufficient regarding the cultural tendencies and trends that 
come with some institutions. While she makes distinctions re-
garding the monetary system, her distinction only extends to real 
money compared to counterfeit or play money. According to the 
St. Louis branch of the Federal Reserve, there are two types of 
“real” money: representative money and fiat money. Representa-
tive money is defined as a certificate or token that can be ex-
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changed for the underlying commodity. Fiat money is defined as 
money that does not have intrinsic value and does not represent 
an asset in a vault somewhere.IX Taking into account these two 
types of money, as well as how the value of money differs be-
tween cultures, I intend to show that although all of these things 
can exist in “one real world,”  the specific value of currency or 
the type of currency used is normatively relativistic.X By this I 
mean that outside of any given culture with a set standard of eco-
nomic values, currency may be treated differently or not as such 
at all.  
Representative money does not necessarily refute Haack’s 
principle of reality. In this version of the monetary system, mon-
ey represents some “real” thing, or real “X.” This could be any-
thing from “real gold” to “real cows,” with gold or cows respec-
tively being the “sortal term” to which “real” is applied. While 
these things are real, the physical money itself is also real. The 
value of the money in this system, however, is contingent on 
what “real” object it represents. The value of these real objects to 
a culture is where the real-ness begins to become relative. While 
it is true that two physical currencies in two separate cultures can 
both physically exist as real objects at the same time, the values 
of these currencies may differ in many respects. An example of 
this is if one currency represented a standard or stock of gold, 
while the other one represented a commodity, such as cattle. Cat-
tle in one society may be as valuable as gold, or even more valua-
ble. This theoretical society that uses cattle as a medium of ex-
change may not have any immediate use for gold as a commodi-
ty.  
 In contrast to representative money, fiat money is defined 
as having no intrinsic value, and does not represent anything 
which may have a clear intrinsic value (e.g., sheep, gold, cattle, 
etc.). While representative money in itself does not have intrinsic 
value, it often represents something which may have intrinsic 
value. Fiat money does not represent any tangible asset, but in-
stead is money solely because some authority decides it is mon-
ey. This type of money represents an institution that is even less 
based in reality than representative money. While representative 
money represents a “real” asset in the world, fiat money repre-
sents a confidence in the ability to spend money for goods and 
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services. The entire system of fiat money is based on the values 
that one particular culture or society deems appropriate. 
 Given these two basic forms of money, Haack’s distinc-
tion of the “real” according to “sortal terms” can be revisited. 
Earlier in the article, she argues that something can be simply im-
agined X, or imagined as X and then become “real X,” or imag-
ined X and then become “a physical representation of X.”XI These 
distinctions create problems in the reality of the monetary system, 
as money either represents an asset, or represents something com-
pletely intangible, such as being money solely based on a social 
contract. Haack considers the implications of this in her article, 
“The World According to Innocent Realism.” 
 In this article, Haack maintains that if fictionality comes 
in degrees, then it follows that reality comes in degrees.XII This 
argument poses a plausible solution to the problem with money, 
as one form of money which represents something may be “more 
realistic” than one based solely on social contract but still exist in 
Haack’s “one real world.” However, I find this distinction to be 
insufficient for dispelling the argument against money as being 
universally “real.” Physically, money is a tangible object in reali-
ty; you can hold it, touch it, and you can use senses to determine 
what it is. The form money takes varies from culture to culture, 
but the institution of money at least is plausibly universal. So re-
garding money in this basic manner, yes, the institution of money 
is part of “one real world.” Even the things that money represents 
are part of this one world. Values, ideas, and anything relating to 
the monetary system partake in this principle of “innocent real-
ism.” However, this leaves room for a complex problem of rela-
tivism. Haack may be applying the principle liberally enough to 
encompass ideas like relativism, but admitting that all of these 
values and ideas are valid in reality leaves room for cultural or 
normative relativism to be a regular aspect of this all-
encompassing principle of “innocent realism.” If things relative 
to each respective culture are considered real, it begs the question 
of whether valid money in one culture remains “real” when 
brought into another culture. 
 This problem is evident when making the distinction be-
tween real and counterfeit money. Although the distinction be-
tween the two is made, “real money” can differ specifically from 
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culture to culture. If you tried to pay for an item in Russian rubles 
in an American market, it is probable that they will reject your 
currency. While the ruble is just as real as the American dollar as 
far as money is concerned, it is not real to the culture of America, 
in-so-much as it lacks value in that culture. In this context, 
whether a given currency is real is dependent solely on the value 
it has within an institution. While you can have your currency 
exchanged to match that of a particular culture, the reality of the 
institution is still based on the values of that particular culture. 
The problem deepens when the two basic types of money are 
considered on this point.  
 Representative money is often based on a standard or as-
set which gives it value. While the culture determines which asset 
is valuable enough to standardize their currency on, the object of 
consideration often still holds intrinsic value across multiple cul-
tures. While not all cultures may value cattle as a basis for trade, 
it is enough of a commodity that even if currency is not accepted, 
it is still likely that you could barter the cattle for another object 
of value. In the case of fiat money, however, relativism takes 
precedence. Since fiat money represents nothing but the authority 
of itself (after it is deemed valuable), it holds no value apart from 
that which it has in the culture in which it exists. Its value is 
based on the confidence that other people will accept it as legal 
tender.XIII This system of thought pertaining to what is valued in 
any specific culture almost ensures societal relativism, with the 
only familiar concept being the universal idea or system of mon-
ey. Money holds as being more “real” when it represents a com-
modity that exists in reality and not a social contract, but even by 
this social contract, the assets it represents can be highly relative. 
The only reason that this latter form of monetary representation 
could be potentially more real is if the money is an asset or repre-
sents an asset, it can be traded on the basis of its own value (e.g., 
cattle, sheep, gold, corn, etc.). 
 Thus, Haack’s requirement that “real” always take a 
“sortal term” is insufficient to identify culturally specific prob-
lems regarding the value of money. While she can distinguish 
between what is “real” and “fictional” by utilizing this method, 
she can do little to distinguish two equally “real” forms of curren-
cy within this system. She cannot argue that one form of currency 
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is “more real” than the other, as they are all part of the same basic 
system of monetary economics. She agrees that this system is 
“real” in her argument regarding “innocent realism” when she 
claims that her idea of reality includes “social institutions, roles, 
rules, and norms.”XIV This leaves room for the point to be argued 
that even though, on her view, reality comes in degrees, even 
these degrees can be relative to culturally defined values.  
  One might argue that because economics is a system or 
institution in Haack’s “innocent realism,” the only relativism it 
displays is descriptive relativism because money is a fact about 
the world, and its variations are merely different descriptions of 
the same thing.XV This means that the initial problem goes away 
because the relativism is being treated as simply having cosmetic 
differences, and not acting differently between cultures. Since 
money is part of every culture in some form, the system of money 
itself of course will have differences. The only way that this rela-
tivism can be treated as normative is if the values pertaining to 
the monetary system differ from culture to culture. This argument 
for descriptive relativism is mundane because often it regards mi-
nute differences in properties that are real in each culture (e.g. eye 
color, height, etc.). Since the institution of money both exists in 
the real world and is universally common, it is likely that it would 
be approached in this manner. However, when you examine the 
content of the institution, rather than the institution itself, a prob-
lem arises in the treatment of this as merely descriptive relativ-
ism. The main basis of the problem is that the monetary system 
involves direct communication and exchange between multiple 
cultures and societies. This interaction means that if the relativ-
ism is merely descriptive, the value of currency should not 
change between cultures, even if the form it takes does. 
While the American dollar and the Russian ruble are both 
“real” money, their respective values are contingent on the socie-
ty from which they originate. If both represented an asset in reali-
ty, the problem would be more easily rectified. For example, if 
the dollar and ruble both operated on a standard of gold, they 
would both represent a similar asset. Even then, however, the val-
ue one society places on gold may differ wildly from that of an-
other society, and this can cause problems in exchanging assets. 
The problem becomes even more complex when certain curren-
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cies from these various economic systems operate as fiat money, 
rather than representative money. The specific currency loses al-
most all inter-cultural value and can only exist as valid in the 
confidence of its own economic system because it only holds val-
ue in a society where it is said to be valuable.  
Considering this, while institutions can potentially be uni-
versal and real, the intricacies of each institution may remain rel-
ative in a normative sense. This relativism is normative only be-
cause cultures can interact with one another and the currencies 
which they use in one country may not be acceptable in another. 
While this provides a basis for normative relativism, it may also 
be argued that this problem is circumvented by international cur-
rency exchange markets. In these markets dollars can be ex-
changed for rubles, rubles for euros, and so on. This argument 
does not take into account, however, the relative nature of the 
store of value per currency and also does not take into account 
the implications this relativism has for other institutions besides 
that of monetary economics. 
The value of a dollar is less than the value of a euro. To 
buy a euro, it is necessary to spend more than one dollar, because 
the euro has a larger store of value than the dollar. Once again, 
this is dictated by certain social and cultural norms and their re-
spective values. While Haack asserts that there is one single 
world in her “innocent realism,” it seems that certain aspects of 
this realism also make “real” certain relativisms. With this in 
mind, dividing “real” versus “fictional” with the use of “sortal 
terms,” as well as determining that all of this happens in one 
world, does nothing to explain how reality differs among those 
with different systems of value. 
Haack says that the “real” can be divided into “sortal 
terms,” where both reality and representations of reality can be 
“real.” I argue that her concept of reality does not take into ac-
count culturally specific values defined inside of “real” institu-
tions. One might object that while these institutions may be based 
on social or cultural norms, they are still “real,” especially ac-
cording to Haack’s “innocent realism.” I would reply that even if 
all these values are “real” according to Haack’s view of “innocent 
realism,” the specific properties and standards of these institu-
tions is contingent on culturally defined values. 
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I These “sortal terms” can be characterized as a modifier for a 
term. In the case of the term “real” they modify it and further 
categorize its relevant meaning and usage according to the 
circumstances in which it is being used.  
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